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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID MARK NEWTON WHEELER, 
a minor child, by and 
through his guardian ad 
litem, MARK WAYNE WHEELER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
STANLEY C. MANN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 19730 
RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in 
the Plaintiff-Respondent's ("Wheeler") favor requiring the 
Defendant, Stanley C. Mann ("Mann") to repay the David Newton 
Wheeler Trust ("Trust") all funds Mann received as trustee and 
invested or loaned to companies he and his family owned and 
controlled. Mann lost the entire trust fund. On September, 
1983 the trial court entered a partial summary judgment 
holding Mann liable for breaching his duty as trustee in the 
principal amount of the trust plus interest from the date of 
receipt, in the amount of $235,137.88 and attorneys' fees of 
$8,000.00. 
On March 7, 1984, Wheeler filed a motion to dismiss 
this appeal on numerous procedural grounds including Mann's 
failure to file a timely notice of appeal and a docketing 
statementf to post a cost bond and to designate the record on 
appeal. This appeal was briefed by both parties and oral 
argument was heard on February 10, 1987. On June 30, 1988, 
the Court filed its opinion in this matter (the "Opinion"). 
In the Opinion the court declined to dispose of this case on 
the procedural grounds raised by Wheeler, and instead, 
affirmed the trial court's decision on the merits* In 
response to the opinion, Mann filed a pleading entitled 
"Appellant's Opposition to Supreme Court Ruling Filed on June 
30, 1988" (the "Opposition")/ which the Court has treated as a 
Petition for Rehearing. 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mann makes three assignments of error in his 
opposition. The two assignments of error to which this 
memorandum will respond are: 
1. The Court erred in finding that Mann had 
failed to argue in the trial court that certain language 
contained in the trust instrument authorized Mann's self-
dealing investments and declining to consider that portion of 
Mann's argument based on that language. 
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2. The Court erred by failing to appoint Gail 
Taylorf instead of First Interstate Bank/ as successor Trustee 
to Mann. 
II. THE COURT DOES NOT EVEN NEED TO CONSIDER MANN'S 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
The procedural defects in Mann's appeal alone prevent 
the Court from needing to address Mann's assignments of error. 
Mann failed to file a docketing statement and a designation of 
the record on appeal and to post a cost bond. As the court 
stated in its opinion "the failure to file a cost bond/ a 
docketing statement/ and a designation of record clearly 
justifies dismissal." 86 Utah Av. Rep. 3/ (Sup.Ct. June 30/ 
1988) (citing Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin/ Wright 
& Miles, 681 P.2d 1258/ 1264 (Utah 1984); R. Utah S. Ct. 9). 
Thus, Mann's petition for Rehearing should be denied because 
in any event/ Mann's appeal should have been dismissed. 
Mann's appeal suffers from another fatal defect—Mann 
never filed a notice of appeal. The trial court entered 
partial summary judgment in Wheeler's favor on September 139 
1983. An order granting partial summary judgment is not a 
final appealable order. South Shores Concession/ Inc. v. 
State/ 600 P.2d 550, 557 (Utah 1979). Thus the September 13, 
1983 order was not appealable. 
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On September 22, 1983, Mann filed a pleading entitled 
Motion for Appeal. The "Motion for Appeal" was neither served 
on Wheeler's attorneys nor was it ever set for a hearing. On 
November 28, 1983, the Court entered an order declaring the 
partial summary judgment to be the final judgment in this 
case. Mann did not thereafter file a notice of appeal. 
Even if the "Motion for Appeal" could to be treated 
as a notice of appeal, the Court should have dismissed this 
appeal because a notice of appeal filed prior to entry of the 
final appealable order is not sufficient to give the court 
jurisdiction over an appeal of that final order. See Acosta 
v, Louisiana Dep't. of Health and Human Resources, 106 S.Ct. 
2876, 2877-78 (1986). Rather a notice of appeal must be 
timely filed after the entry of the final order to invoke the 
Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Id. Thus, the Court should 
disregard Mann's Opposition and affirm the trial court by 
dismissing this appeal. 
III. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR MANN'S FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF 
ERROR 
A. The Court did not Err in Disregarding Mann's 
Argument. 
Mann argued on appeal that the trust instrument 
expressly authorized him to invest in companies he managed and 
controlled. In support of that argument Mann cited the 
following provision (the "Investment Provision'1): 
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(g) the fiduciary may invest and reinvest 
funds and other assets in such properties as 
men of prudence, discretion and intelligence 
purchase for their own accounts, having regard 
not to speculation, but to the permanent 
disposition of their funds and considering the 
probable income as well as the probable safety 
of their capital, including, but not by way of 
limitation, common trust funds, shares and 
obligations of the fiduciary and shares and 
obligations of any affiliate, whether or not 
of the character otherwise permitted by law 
for the investment of funds of a fiduciary. 
("Emphasis added") 
In its opinion the Court stated that it declined to consider 
Mann's argument based on the emphasized language because Mann 
had not raised it below. Mann now attempts to contradict the 
Court's finding by attaching to the Opposition excerpts of the 
transcript of the hearing on the Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. A review of those transcript excerpts reveals that 
Mann quoted most of the language of the Investment Provision 
but never indicated how or what language authorized him to 
invest in corporations he owned and controlled. Thus, the 
courts refusal to consider the argument was justified. 
B. The Investment Provision did not Authorize 
Mann's Self-Dealing Investments. 
Even if Mann had raised the argument discussed above 
at the trial level, this Court must affirm the trial court's 
summary judgment. When the existence of a written 
instrument's provisions are clear and complete, the meaning of 
the instrument's provisions can appropriately be resolved by 
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the Court on summary judgment. Morris v. Mountain States Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Utah 1983). In interpreting 
the terms of a trust instrument, investment powers the Court 
must strictly construe any terms authorizing investment and, 
in the absence of an unequivocal grant of investment power 
that exceeds statutory restrictions, the investment must be 
deemed prohibited. First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Perkins, 275 
Wis. 464, 82 NW.2d 33 (1957). 
On appeal, Mann argued that the language of the 
Investment provision permitting investment in "shares and 
obligations of the fiduciary" constitutes an unequivocal grant 
of authority that exceeds the self-dealing restrictions of 
Utah Code Ann. Section 75-7-404(2) (1978). That argument, is 
meritless. The language relied on by Mann clearly assumes 
that the trustee is a corporation in which stock is issued, an 
entity which acts through independent officers and directors 
with their own fiduciary duties, and which could purchase its 
own shares and obligations if such purchase was prudent and 
non-speculative. Mann, however, is clearly not such a 
trustee. He is an individual, not a corporation. He lacks 
the independent judgment, as was clearly evidenced in this 
case to make prudent judgments about his own business 
ventures. Thus, applying the strict rules governing the 
construction of the Investment Provision, the court could have 
concluded only that Mann's self-dealing investments were not 
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permitted by the Investment provision and thus without prior 
judicial authorization were prohibited by Utah Code Ann. 
Section 75-7-404(2). 
Mann admitted below that he never attempted to obtain 
prior judicial authorization for the self-dealing stock 
purchases. The trial court's summary judgment must therefore 
be affirmed. 
C. The Investment Provision is Void because it 
Violates Public Policy"! 
If the Court were to interpret the Investment 
provision in the manner suggested by Mann, it would be void as 
a violation of public policy. Mann, relying on Dipo v. Dipo, 
526 P.2d 923 (Utah 1974), argued on appeal that any trust 
provision, even though violative of statute, must be 
respected. Mann's suggested interpretation of the Investment 
Provision would permit him to have acted without the scrutiny 
of any independent decision maker. In In re Estate of 
Wallich, 18 Utah 2d 240, 420 P.2d 40, 43 (1966), this court 
held that a provision in a trust instrument authorizing the 
trustee to act "without the necessity of making any accounting 
to any person or party" was unenforceable because it was 
against public policy where it would effectively permit the 
trustee to "take property which rightfully belongs to 
another." Mann's suggested interpretation clearly contravenes 
this Court's pronouncement of of public policy. Thus, even if 
the trial court had accepted Mann's interpretation, it would 
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have been constrained to hold the Investment Provision 
unenforceable. The trial court's summary judgment therefore 
must be affirmed. 
D. The Trial Court's Summary Judgment Must be Confirmed 
Because Mann's Self-Dealing was Imprudent and 
Speculative as a Matter of Law. 
The trial court's inquiry in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment is whether there is a "genuine issue of fact" 
remaining for trial Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 
2505, 2510-12 (1986). If the evidence on one side is 
overwhelming, summary judgment must be granted as a matter of 
law. Id. at 106 S.Ct. at 2510-12. As discussed above, the 
Investment Provision does not authorize self-dealing 
investments of the kind Mann made without prior judicial 
approval in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-404. It is 
undisputed that Mann did not obtan prior judicial approval. 
Thus, the evidence is more than overwhelming, it is conclusive 
that Mann's investments were prohibited by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-7-404. 
In addition to the statutory requirement that self-
dealing investments be approved by the Court, the Investment 
Provision clearly requires all investments, regardless of the 
entity in which the investment is made, to be of the type that 
"men of prudence, discretion and intelligence purchase of 
their own accounts, having regard not to speculation, but to 
permanent disposition of their funds and considering the 
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probably income as well as the probable safety" of the trust 
assets. This Court must uphold the trial court if the 
evidence that was before the trial court overwhelmingly 
demonstrates that Mann's investments were imprudent and 
speculative. 
Under the Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. standard 
the trial court was compelled to grant summary judgment for 
Wheeler. Facts undisputed before the trial court that 
demonstrate the imprudence and the speculative nature of 
Mann's investments are as follows: 
1. At the time Mann transferred trust funds 
to Western Marketing Resources between March 
1979 and March 1980, it was suffering huge 
operating losses* Its March 1979 financial 
statement showed a $160,000 operating loss for 
the year ending on March 31, 1979 and its 
March 1980 financial statement showed a 
$227,000 net operating loss for the year 
ending March 31, 1981. See March 31, 1979 and 
March 31, 1980 financial statements included 
in Exhibit F to Wheeler's Memorandum Brief in 
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
("Memorandum Brief"); Order dated December 22, 
1981, Finding No* 8; Order dated January 18, 
1983, Finding No. 1. At the time Mann 
"investedH in Western Marketing Resources it 
had no assets and heavy debts. See Id. 
2. The Western Marketing Resources stock 
that Mann purchased was non-voting stock with 
no express right to receive interest or 
dividends. Exhibit E to Memorandum Brief. 
3. Western Marketing Resources had never 
made a profit and it could never even pay Mann 
a salary from the time of its organization in 
1975 until it ceased to function in 1982. 
Deposition of Stanley Mann, at p. 187 and 
143-144. 
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Investments in companies with heavy debt that are suffering 
heavy losses and that present no prospect of dividend payment 
are as a matter of law, speculative and imprudent. St. 
Germaine's Admin, v. Tuttle, 114 Vt. 203, 44 A.2d 137 (1945). 
Mann has presented no substantial evidence to contradict the 
foregoing facts. Thus, the trial court's summary judgment 
easily satisfies the Anderson v. Liberty Lobby standard and 
must be affirmed with respect to the Western Marketing 
Resources Investments. 
The Quest Publishing, Inc. ("Quest") "Investments" 
are likewise, as a matter of law, imprudent and speculative. 
Mann invested more than $80,000 in Quest immediately after the 
company had been formed. Exhibit I to Memorandum Brief, Mann 
Depo at p. 77. Quest had no experience in publishing, no 
contracts with any agent or publisher and no completed 
manuscript. Mann Depo at pp. 287-89. Moreover, the more than 
$80,000 of trust funds purchased only a minority interest in 
Quest, Mann Depo at p. 77. Mann, of course, owned the 
majority interest but does not know how much he paid for that 
interest. Mann Depo at p. 77. Again these admissions were 
unrefuted by Mann in the court below, meaning that the court's 
summary judgment with respect to the Quest Investment meets 
the Anderson v. Liberty Lobby standard and must be upheld. 
There is further undisputed evidence that both the 
Western Marketing Resources and Quest Investments were 
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speculative and imprudent. To hide his "investment" in these 
companies Mann "laundered" the trust funds through a Chicago 
friend. Mann Depo at p. 53. Mann lied under oath about 
having made "those investment." Mann Depo at p. 31; 
Transcript of Trial Court August 18f 1983, hearing on Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment at 37. Mann destroyed the 
records concerning the investment after he had lied under oath 
about making those investments. Mann Depo at p. 31. It is 
not necessary for men of prudence with regard to their 
investments to launder money, to destroy records and to deny 
the "investments" under oath. A "prudent" investment need not 
be hidden. Mr. Mann did not nor can he justify his 
investments. Cinder the Anderson standard, the trial court was 
amply justified in finding all of Mann's unauthorized, self-
dealing investments inappropriate. 
IV. MANN HAS NO STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE TRIAL COURT'S 
APPOINTMENT OF A SUBSTITUTE TRUSTEE. 
Even if there were any merit to Mann's argument that 
the trial court was required to appoint Gail H. Taylor as the 
successor trustee, instead of First Interstate Bank, the Court 
cannot consider the argument because Mann has no standing to 
assert it. Under Utah law only the beneficiary of a trust can 
enforce the terms of the trust. See Child v. Hayward, 16 Utah 
2d 351, 400 P.2d 758, 760 (1965). See also Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts $ 200, Comment d (1959) (only persons who 
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have an interest in the trust can maintain a suit to prevent 
injury to their interest). Mann clearly has no interest in 
the trust that would permit him to complain about the 
appointment of his successor. He is not a beneficiary. 
Moreoverf he was removed as executor of Joan Wheeler's will by 
the Colorado courts and thus, can claim no interest as the 
representative of the trustor. The trial court's appointment 
of First Interstate Bank as successor trustee must therefore 
be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should deny Mann's Petition for Rehearing. 
Even if this Court's original opinion on the merits had not 
been correct, the Court could and should have dismissed this 
appeal on procedural grounds. 
The Court's ruling on the merits, however, was 
correct. The Investment Provision as a matter of law did not 
permit Mann to make self-dealing investments. The Court could 
not interpret the Investment provision to do so and even if it 
did, it could not have enforced the Investment Provision 
because to do so would have violated public policy. 
The Investment Provision clearly limits all 
investments of trust assets to prudent, non-speculative 
investments. The undisputed evidence before the Court below 
was so overwhelming that there was no genuine issue of fact 
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with respect to the speculative and imprudent nature of Mann's 
investments. Mann's self-dealing investments were as a matter 
of law, imprudent and speculative* 
The Court must deny Mann's petition for rehearing for 
all the reasons stated above. Mann has once again filed a 
meritless pleading in this Court. The waste of money to the 
beneficiary and his guardian must finally stop. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ S ^ Y of September, 
1988. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
DG9/KRHP 
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